We study how bank collateral assets and their pledgeability affect the amplitude of credit cycles. To this end, we develop a tractable model where bankers intermediate funds between savers and borrowers. If bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers' assets. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of our credit economy, savers anticipate that liquidating financial assets (i.e., loans) is conditional on borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This friction limits the collateralization of bankers' financial assets beyond that of real assets (i.e., capital). In this context, increasing the pledgeability of financial assets eases more credit and reduces the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus attenuating capital misallocation as it typically emerges in credit economies à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We uncover a close connection between the collateralization of bank loans, macroeconomic amplification and the degree of procyclicality of bank leverage.
Introduction
Lending relationships are typically plagued by information asymmetries that play a key role in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In this respect, banks are of central importance, as they are involved in at least two layers of …nancial contracting, through their intermediation activity between savers and borrowers. This paper focuses on the macroeconomic implications of banks' portfolio decisions over di¤erent assets in the presence of chained …nancial frictions, intended as the combination of collateralized borrowing by both banks and entrepreneurs. To this end, we devise a tractable model that integrates limited enforceability of loan contracts-as popularized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM, hereafter)-with an analogous friction characterizing the …nancial relationship between depositors and bankers. As in recent contributions on banking and the macroeconomy (see, inter alia, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015) , deposits are secured by a fraction of bankers'assets that are pledged as collateral. The main departure from these studies consists of envisaging di¤erent degrees of liquidity-and, thus, pledgeability-for di¤erent types of bank assets. In doing so, our key contribution consists of detailing the mechanisms through which heterogeneous collateral assets shape bankers'incentives to intermediate funds, and ultimately a¤ect the amplitude of credit cycles.
Financial institutions resort to collateralized debt to raise funds, providing assets as a guarantee in case of default on their debt obligations. This is the case for non-traditional banking activitieswith sale and repurchase agreements (repos) employed as the main source of funding-as well as for commercial banks, where securitized-banking often supplements more traditional intermediation activities. In fact, banks employ …nancial collateral both for currency management purposes and, more recently, as part of non-standard monetary policy frameworks. 1 A vast literature has focused on quantifying the dynamic multiplier emerging from the limited enforceability of debt contracts in economies à la KM. 2 While most of the contributions in this tradition have emphasized the role of borrowers'collateral for the ampli…cation of macroeconomic shocks, bank collateral has generally been overlooked. We seek to …ll this gap.
In our model the ability of bankers to intermediate funds between savers and borrowers rests on the composition of di¤erent assets they are able to pledge as collateral. Along with extending bank loans, bankers may also invest in an in…nitely-lived productive asset, 'capital', whose main purpose is to serve as a bu¤er against which the intermediary is trusted to be able to meet its …nancial obligations. As such, capital held by bankers provides a source of insider equity, which is necessary to overcome the agency problem in the model. In turn, deposits are bounded from above by bankers' holdings of both types of collateral assets. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of 1 The set of assets that central banks accept from commercial banks generally includes government bonds and other debt instruments issued by the public sector and international/supranational institutions. In some cases, also securities issued by the private sector can be accepted, such as covered bank bonds, uncovered bank bonds, asset-backed securities or corporate bonds. 2 See Kocherlakota (2000) , Krishnamurthy (2003) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) , inter alia.
2 our credit economy savers anticipate that, in case of bankers'default, liquidating their …nancial claims (i.e., bank loans) is subordinated to borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This friction, which has not been formerly investigated, a¤ects savers' perceived liquidity of bankers' …nancial assets beyond that of capital, 3 inducing a transaction cost depositors have to bear in order to liquidate bank loans. If the latter are regarded as relatively illiquid, savers will be less prone to accept them as collateral.
A key feature of the model is that combining limited enforceability of deposit and loan contracts reduces the interest rate on loans below the one that would prevail in a standard economy where only loans are secured by collateral assets. This allows borrowers to extend their capital holdings, contributing to increase total production in the steady state and alleviating capital misallocation as it emerges in economies à la KM, where borrowers hold too little capital in equilibrium, due to constrained borrowing. This property has a key implication for equilibrium dynamics: as the propagation of technology shifts crucially rests on the distribution of real assets between lenders and borrowers, envisaging …nancially constrained intermediaries into an otherwise standard KM economy produces a 'banking attenuator'that is neither linked to the procyclicality of the external …nance premium (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007) , nor to monopolistic competition and interest rate-setting rigidities in …nancial intermediation (Gerali et al., 2010) .
The main distinction between di¤erent types of bank collateral lies in the way they a¤ect bankers'incentives to intermediate funds. Both assets have the potential to relax bankers'…nancial constraint. However, while increasing real assets exacerbates capital misallocation and reduces lending through a negative externality on borrowers'demand for credit, increasing bankers' holdings of …nancial assets compresses the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus attenuating capital misallocation. This feature of the model has key implications for equilibrium dynamics under di¤erent degrees of collateralization of bank loans. A relatively scarce liquidity of bankers'…nancial assets ampli…es the response of gross output to productivity shocks. As in KM, a positive technology shift reallocates capital from the lenders to the borrowers. On one hand, this allows borrowers to expand their borrowing capacity. On the other hand, a decline in bankers'real assets is typically counteracted by an expansion in bank loans: as the latter are perceived to be increasingly illiquid, the compensation e¤ect is gradually muted, so that bankers need to cut their capital investment further to meet borrowers'higher demand for credit. In turn, the response of total production-which increases in borrowers'real assets, ceteris paribus-is ampli…ed, relative to situations in which deposit contracts involve relatively low transaction costs in case of bankers' default.
The model produces a countercyclical ' ‡ight to quality' in bankers' optimal asset allocation (see, e.g., Lang and Nakamura, 1995) : during expansions (contractions), bankers increase (decrease) their holdings of the relatively illiquid asset-bank loans-while decreasing (increasing) their capital holdings, which do not bear any risk of default. As a result, 'too much'borrowing capacity is allocated during boom states and 'too little'in bad states, inducing a procyclical bank leverage and generating excessive ‡uctuations in credit, output and asset prices. From a normative viewpoint, we study to which extent a hypothetical banking regulator may intervene to smooth the amplitude of these ‡uctuations, by impairing the endogenous propagation mechanism that hinges on capital misallocation. Along with removing or reducing systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the …nancial system, the Bank of England has recently indicated how macroprudential policy making should facilitate the supply of …nance for productive investment, thus making capital allocation more e¢ cient (Bank of England, 2016). With respect to our model, we show that a constant capital-to-asset ratio attenuates the transmission of technology shifts, although the gap between borrowers'and bankers'marginal product of capital cannot entirely be closed. By contrast, the regulator may successfully attenuate the economy's response to productivity shocks, devising a state-dependent capital bu¤er that induces a countercyclical bank leverage and stabilizes ‡uctuations in borrowers'collateral, even without resolving the distortion in capital allocation. This is accomplished by adjusting the capital-to-asset ratio in response to changes in bank lending: when the rule features enough responsiveness, movements in the value of borrowers'collateral assets are counteracted by similar-sized changes in the loan rate, so that the traditional ampli…cation mechanism embodied by borrowers'collateral constraint is neutralized.
Related literature This paper is strictly related to a growing literature that introduces …nancial intermediation into well established quantitative macroeconomic frameworks, so as to account for a number of distinctive features of the last …nancial crisis (see, inter alia, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). To name a few, Gertler and Karadi (2011) , have devised a model that emphasizes the role of collateral that banks post to their lenders, as well as their net worth, for the transmission of unconventional monetary measures. 4 Gertler et al. (2012) extend the baseline insights of this framework, allowing intermediaries to issue outside equity-thus making risk exposure an endogenous choice of the banking sector-while Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) devise a model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs. More recently, Hirakata et al. (2017) have introduced chained …nancial contracts into a dynamic general equilibrium models à la Bernanke et al. (1999) . 5 The common trait of these contributions and many others in this tradition is to look at di¤erent sources of funding of …nancial intermediaries-thus emphasizing the composition of the right-hand side of banks'balance sheet-while typically considering only one type of asset-bank loans. We deviate from this approach and focus on the role of limited enforceability of deposit contracts in a setting where banks may invest in di¤erent assets, 6 whose 4 See also subsequent contributions in this modeling tradition, such as Rannenberg (2012) and Garcia-Cicco et al.
(2015), as well as earlier contributions that have stressed the role of bank capital for the transmission of a variety of shocks, such as Aikman and Paustian (2006) and Meh and Moran (2010) . 5 Unlike the present framework-which is based on costly enforcement of both deposit and loan contracts-Hirakata et al. (2017) consider costly state veri…cation problems applying to both intermediaries and entrepreneurs. 6 In this respect, our framework is closer to Chen (2001) , who stresses the importance of moral hazard behavior distinctive trait is to bear di¤erent degrees of liquidity depending on whether they are involved in more than one layer of …nancial relationships. The paper is also part of a rapidly developing banking literature on the role of macroprudential policy-making. Some recent examples include Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Harris et. al (2015) , Clerc et. al (2015) , Begenau (2015) and Elenev et al. (2017) . These contributions rely on medium-to large-scale dynamic general equilibrium models. While an obvious advantage of this modeling approach is to allow for a variety of shocks, transmission channels and alternative policy settings, our framework allows for a neater interpretation of the interplay between bank capital requirements, capital misallocation and the amplitude of credit cycles. In this respect, our framework is more closely related to Gersbach and Rochet (2016) , who show that complete markets do not su¢ ciently stabilize credit-driven ‡uctuations, thus providing a clear rationale for macroprudential-policy intervention.
This paper contributes to the existing literature along two main routes. First, one obvious advantage of our model over the existing contributions is analytical tractability, especially if we compare our setting to the existing tradition of medium-to large-scale general equilibrium models featuring a banking sector. In this respect, we show that i) limited enforceability of deposits and loan contracts generate opposite e¤ects on capital misallocation, and ii) a higher pledgeability of bank holdings of …nancial assets reduces the ampli…cation of aggregate macroeconomic shocks. Second, a de…ning feature of our normative analysis is to study to which extent a regulator may promote a more e¢ cient allocation of productive capital by 'leaning against'capital misallocation. In this respect, we emphasize that examining capital misallocation, in line with the seminal work of KM, is paramount to understand the role of credit frictions in a model with …nancial intermediation that is a¤ected by a (double) moral hazard problem, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Chen (2001) . In particular, we show that shock ampli…cation is a direct function of the misallocation of capital, and that macroprudential policies are e¤ective only in so far as they can ameliorate distortions in the allocation of capital.
Structure The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the framework; Section 3 discusses the steady-state equilibrium; Section 4 focuses on equilibrium dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state and the ampli…cation of shocks to productivity in connection with the degree of …nancial collateralization; Section 5 examines the role of macroprudential policy-making in reducing capital misallocation to smooth macroeconomic ‡uctuations; Section 6 concludes.
Model
The economy is populated by three types of in…nitely-lived, unit-sized, agents: savers, borrowers and bankers. There are two layers of …nancial relationships: savers make deposits to the bankers, of both bankers and entrepeneurs in a quantitative model à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . However, in this framework there is no role for liquidity assessment of di¤erent types of bank assets. who act as …nancial intermediaries and extend credit to the borrowers. Two goods are traded in this economy: a durable asset, 'capital', and a non-durable consumption good. Capital, which is held by both bankers and borrowers, does not depreciate and is …xed in total supply to one. All agents have linear preferences de…ned over non-durable consumption. 7;8 The remainder of this section provides further details on the characteristics of the actors populating the economy and their decision rules. 9 
Savers
Savers are the most patient agents in the economy. In each period, they are endowed with an exogenous, non-produced income. We assume that savers are neither capable of monitoring the activity of the borrowers, nor of enforcing direct …nancial contracts with them. As a result, they make deposits at the …nancial intermediaries. The linearity of their preferences implies that savers are indi¤erent between consumption and deposits in equilibrium, so that gross interest rate on savings (deposits), R S , equals their rate of time preference, 1= S . Savers'budget constraint reads as:
where c S t denotes the consumption of non-durables, b S t is the amount of savings and " S is a …xed endowment. 10 
Borrowers
Borrowers' ability to attract external funding is bounded by the limited enforceability of debt contracts. In line with Hart and Moore (1994) we assume that, should borrowers default, bankers acquire the right to liquidate the stock of capital, k B t . Based on the predicted outcomes of the renegotiation, borrowers are subject to an enforcement constraint. Neither bankers nor borrowers 7 The model will be solved by log-linearizing it around its long-run equilibrium. In this respect, some assumptions will be introduced to pin down the steady state, and rule out degenerate allocations of consumption and assets across the three types of agents. 8 In this respect, it is important to recall that a number of studies have shown that collateral constraints can act as a powerful ampli…cation and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks under simplifying assumptions on preferences and production technologies. Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) are some noteworthy examples, in this respect. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out how modelling collateral constraints has become the dominant approach when introducing …nancial frictions into otherwise standard DSGE models, and how their combination with asymmetrc information problems a¤ecting the banking sector typically enhances the ampli…cation of a variety of shocks, even under more standard assumptions on preferences and production technologies. 9 Appendix B reports the derivation of the …rst-order conditions, and a summary of the key equilibrium conditions of the model. 10 Steady-state variables are reported without the time subscript.
6 are able to observe the liquidation value before the actual default, though borrowers have all the bargaining power in the liquidation process. With probability 1 ! bankers expect to recover no collateral asset after a default, while with probability ! bankers expect to be able to recover
where E t indicates the rational expectation operator and q t+1 denotes the capital price at time t + 1.
To derive the renegotiation outcome, we consider the following default scenarios:
1. Bankers expect to recover E t q t+1 k B t . Since bankers can expropriate the whole stock of capital, borrowers have to make a payment that leaves bankers indi¤erent between liquidation and allowing borrowers to preserve the stock of collateral assets. This requires borrowers to make a payment at least equal to E t q t+1 k B t , so that the ex-post value of defaulting from the perspective of the borrowers is:
where R B denotes the gross loan rate and b B t is the loan.
2. Bankers expect to recover no collateral. If the liquidation value is zero, liquidation is clearly not the best option for the borrowers. Therefore, borrowers have no incentive to pay the loan back. The ex-post default value in this case is:
Therefore, enforcement requires that the expected value of non defaulting is not smaller than the expected value of defaulting, that is: tically-through a linear production technology
with t being a multiplicative productivity shifter: log t = log t 1 + u t , where 2 [0; 1) and u t is an iid shock. Borrowers maximize their utility under the collateral and the ‡ow-of-funds constraints, taking R B as given. The linearity of their preferences implies that the shadow value of borrowing amounts to 1 B R B . In equilibrium, the collateral constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of a determinate steady state:
In light of this, borrowers' demand for capital is determined at the point where the present value of the marginal product of capital, B E t t+1 , is equal to the opportunity cost of holding
Bankers
Bankers'primary activity consists of intermediating funds between savers and borrowers. However, their ability to attract savers'…nancial resources is bounded by the limited enforceability of the deposit contracts, given that bankers may divert assets for personal use (see also Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015) . At this stage of the analysis we abstract from the implementation of regulatory bank capital ratios to discourage bankers'moral hazard behavior, while focusing on the characteristics of the deposit contract. We assume that, upon bankers' default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers' asset holdings. 11 At the time of contracting the amount of deposits, though, the liquidation value of bankers'assets is uncertain. In this respect, the enforcement problem is isomorphic to that characterizing bankers'lending relationship with the borrowers. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of the credit economy, we envisage an additional friction that limits the pledgeability of bank loans beyond that of capital. While real assets remain in the availability of the bankers for the entire duration of the deposit contract-so that savers can frictionlessly liquidate them in case of bankers'default-the resources corresponding to bankers'…nancial claims are in the availability of the borrowers. Therefore, from the perspective of the savers the possibility to liquidate b B t in the event of a default of the banking sector goes beyond the capacity of the bankers to honor the deposit contract, while being subordinated to borrowers'solvency. In light of this, we assume that savers account for a transaction cost they would have to bear for seizing bank loans: (1 ) b B t , where 2 [0; 1] indexes savers'perceived liquidity of bankers'…nancial assets. In the extreme case, savers regard bank loans as completely illiquid and do not accept them as collateral, is set to zero (i.e., …nancial frictions are no longer chained), while = 1 corresponds to a situation in which savers attach no risk to their ability of liquidating …nancial assets in case bankers'default.
To derive the renegotiation outcome, we assume that with probability 1 savers expect to recover no collateral, while with probability the expected recovery value is
where k I t denotes bankers'holdings of capital and b B t represents the amount of bank loans held as collateral, net of transaction costs. This implies the following default scenarios:
Since savers expect to expropriate the stock of real and …nancial assets after bearing a transaction cost (1 ) b B t , bankers have to make a payment that leaves savers indi¤erent between liquidation and allowing borrowers to preserve the stock of collateral assets. This requires bankers to make a payment at least equal to
so that the ex-post value of defaulting from the perspective of the bankers is:
2. Savers expect to recover no collateral. If the liquidation value is zero, liquidation is clearly not the best option for the savers. Therefore, bankers have no incentive to pay deposits back. The ex-post default value in this case is:
Enforcement requires that the expected value of not defaulting is not smaller than the expected value of defaulting, so that:
which reduces to
according to which deposits should be limited from above by a fraction of the discounted expected collateral value. As we shall see later, the above condition is assumed to always hold with equality. Notably, bankers' collateral constraint embodies the notion that real and …nancial assets have di¤erent degrees of liquidity (see also Bernanke and Gertler, 1985) . 12 In fact, (12) recalls the liquidity constraint envisaged by Benigno and Nisticò (2017) , where safe and pseudo-safe assets co-exist and both contribute to set the maximum amount of resources available for consumption. In their case, while the entire stock of safe assets (i.e., money) is available to …nance private expenditure, only a fraction of pseudo-safe assets can be employed to cover consumption, as it displays less-than-perfect liquidity. Some considerations are in order about the role of the capital goods held by the bankers. First, this asset mainly serves as a bu¤er against which the intermediary is trusted to be able to meet its …nancial obligations. 13 This is reminiscent of Bernanke and Gertler (1985) , where the …nancial sector owns bank capital to provide a source of insider equity, which is necessary to overcome the agency problem in the model (from the perspective of the intermediary). In addition, k I t is important in that it breaks the tight link between deposits and lending-which would be otherwise embodied by a binding deposit contract-thus allowing for the possibility that a countercyclical ' ‡ight to quality'drives the supply of credit. In the present context, such an e¤ect would translate into bankers'allocating relatively more resources to capital investment-which, unlike bank loans, does not bear any risk of default-during adverse periods. In turn, this mechanism may open the route to the emergence of credit crunch episodes (Bernanke and Lown, 1991) . Finally, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1985) we assume that capital is productive, being employed by bankers to invest in projects on their own behalf. 14 Speci…cally, bankers'production technology is assumed to feature the following properties:
with 15 where % equals the marginal product of capital for the …nancial intermediary:
where I denotes bankers' discount factor and (14) is required to ensure an internal solution in which both bankers and borrowers demand capital. 16 Bankers' ‡ow-of-funds constraint reads as:
where c I t denotes bankers'consumption. Due to the linearity of their preferences, also bankers'shadow value of borrowing is constant and equal to 1 R S I . In the reminder of the analysis, we make the following assumption:
The assumption ensures that the enforcement constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of the steady state, implying that bankers are relatively more impatient than savers. 17 In light of this, unless either or equal zero, bankers always charge a lending rate that is lower than their rate of time preference, as extending loans allows them to relax their …nancial constraint:
from which it is possible to write down the spread between the loan and the deposit rate:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of this equality is the spread that would prevail if bankers could not borrow o¤ their loans (i.e., if = 0), while the second term captures how bankers' …nancial constraint a¤ects their ability to intermediate funds. Increasing and/or compresses the spread. Greater pledgeability of …nancial assets increases the collateral value that savers expect to recover in case of bankers' default. This relaxes the …nancial constraint, eases more deposits and translates into a higher credit supply, thus compressing the lending rate.
The distinction between the two types of collateral has crucial implications for bankers' incentives to intermediate funds between savers and borrowers. On one hand, while increasing k I for credit by decreasing their collateral. On the other hand, increasing b B t attenuates the debtenforcement problem between bankers and borrowers, as implied by the reduction of the spread between the loan and the deposit rate. As it will be discussed in Section 4.2, such a distinction has key implications for equilibrium dynamics.
The Euler equation governing bankers'demand for real assets is
Note that by relaxing (i) and allowing for I R S = 1 (i.e., assuming that bankers are as impatient as savers), (18) reduces to lenders'Euler equation in the conventional direct-credit economy à la KM. Under these circumstances, bankers are no longer …nancially constrained. As we shall see in the next section, this implies both a higher loan rate and a higher user cost of capital from the perspective of the …nancial intermediaries, as compared with what observed when bankers face a binding collateral constraint. These properties will play a crucial role for both the long-run and the short-run behavior of the model economy.
On the Interpretation of Bank Capital
We have followed Bernanke and Gertler (1985) in that we assume the …nancial sector owns bank capital. Speci…cally, bank capital mitigates the potential excessive tendency by banks to take risks and, more generally, can serve as a cushion against solvency problems. Therefore bank capital plays a pivotal role, as it determines the amount of funds intermediated by banks. E¤ectively, this speci…cation is a convenient way to introduce a source of insider capital. An alternative, yet equivalent, formulation of the model can be envisaged by introducing a second productive sector, whose …rms are not a¤ected by solvency issues. Shares (or, equivalently, corporate bonds) of …rms in this sector are bought by the intermediary sector as a way of retaining (liquid) inside capital, which can be used to alleviate the agency problem in the model. Firms in this sector, whose variables are indexed by "L", produce by means of a the following technology:
The price of each share re ‡ects the value of the capital used in this production sector, and the ownership of shares entails the receipt of dividends equal to the value of the production, y L t . 18 This alternative formulation is entirely isomorphic to the one we have described so far, and highlights a possible interpretation of bank capital as the intermediary sector's ownership of securities. Equity and money market funds shares, as well as other debt security holdings (which include corporate bonds, mortgages and other asset-backed securities) are an important and growing share of the …nancial sector's balance sheet, and are often employed as collateral in interbank lending activities, particularly in the repo market. 19 
Market Clearing
To close the model, we need to state the market-clearing conditions. We know that the total supply of capital equals one: k I t + k B t = 1. As for the consumption goods market, the aggregate resource constraint reads as:
where y t denotes the total demand of consumption goods. The aggregate demand and supply for credit are given by the two enforcement constraints (holding with equality) faced by borrowers and bankers, respectively:
which imply that, as savers are indi¤erent between any path of consumption and savings, the amount of deposits is contingent upon bankers'capitalization, so that
. Thus, also the market for …nal goods is cleared according to the Walras'Law.
Equilibrium
Market equilibrium is de…ned as a sequence of prices and allocations of physical capital, debt, and consumption of savers, borrowers and bankers fq t ; k B
Steady State
Financial frictions characterizing both the savers-bankers relationship and the bankers-borrowers relationship deeply a¤ect the properties of the model. Examining their interaction in the long-run is key for understanding the propagation of technology shocks.
In the remainder we impose, without loss of generality, G(k I t 1 ) = k I t 1 , with 2 [0; 1]. Evaluating borrowers'demand for capital (8) in the non-stochastic steady state returns:
From (18) we retrieve the marginal product of bankers'capital, as a function of its price:
so that Equations (22), (23) and k I + k B = 1 pin down borrowers'and bankers'holdings of capital.
In turn, these allow us to characterize the key ine¢ ciency at work in the economy. Importantly, …nancial collateralization only a¤ects the steady state of the economy through its impact on R B , which in turn in ‡uences the capital price through borrowers'Euler, as implied by (22) . 20 [Insert Figure 1 ] Figure 1 contains a sketch of the long-run equilibrium of the economy. On the horizontal axis, borrowers' demand for capital is measured from the left, while bankers' demand from the right. The sum of the two equals one. On the vertical axis we report the marginal product of capital of both borrowers and bankers. Borrowers' marginal product of capital is indicated by the line ACE , while bankers'marginal product is represented by the line DE 0 E . The …rst-best allocation would be attained at E 0 , where the product of capital owned by the bankers and the borrowers is the same, at the margin. In our economy, however, the steady-state equilibrium is at E , where the marginal product of capital of the borrowers (mpk B = 1) exceeds that of the bankers (mpk I = %). That is, relative to the …rst best too little capital is used by the borrowers, due to their …nancial constraint. As discussed by KM, this type of capital misallocation implies a loss of output relative to the …rst-best, as indicated by the area CE 0 E . 21 The following remark elaborates on the relationship between borrowers'and bankers'marginal product of capital:
Remark 1 As long as B < I , bankers' marginal product of capital is lower than that of the borrowers. 20 In light of this, envisaging savers that invest in real assets in place of the bankers would alter neither the role of liquidity of bankers'…nancial collateral, nor the key aggregate implications of the model. 21 The area under the solid line, ACE D, is the steady-state output.
14 In fact, imposing G 0 (k I ) < 1 returns the following inequality:
As we assume B < I , the left-hand side of the inequality is negative, while its right-hand side is positive, given that I R S < 1, R B > ! and R B > ! hold by assumption. Therefore, a distinctive feature of the equilibrium is that the marginal product of borrowers'capital is higher than that of the bankers, given that the former cannot borrow as much as they want. As a result, any shift in capital usage from the borrowers to the bankers will lead to a …rst-order decline in aggregate output, as it will become evident when exploring the linearized economy. So far, the present economy is isomorphic to that put forward by KM, as the suboptimality of the steady-state equilibrium allocation ultimately rests on borrowers' …nancial constraint. However, it is important to note that combining limited enforceability of both deposit and loan contracts induces bankers to hold less capital and increase their marginal product-thus setting the steady-state equilibrium on a more e¢ cient allocation-as compared with the baseline KM economy. To see this, it su¢ ces to set I R S = 1, so as to reduce the model to a direct-credit economy where savers and bankers have identical degrees of impatience. Notably, in this case the productivity gap between bankers and borrowers is higher than that obtained in the economy with …nancial intermediation. This is due to the lenders charging a higher loan rate and attaining a higher steady-state user cost of capital, which exacerbates the ine¢ ciency in capital allocation. In Figure 1 this additional loss of output, relative to the …rst-best allocation, is captured by the trapezoid C KM CE E KM (where E KM indicates the steady-state equilibrium in the KM setting).
In light of this key property, the next step in the analysis consists of understanding how the collateralization of di¤erent types of bank assets impacts on capital misallocation. To this end, we de…ne the productivity gap between borrowers and bankers as mpk B mpk I = 1 %:
As far as the e¤ect of on the productivity gap is concerned, this is not unambiguous: …rst, raising in ‡ates the steady-state capital price by compressing the intermediation spread, as embodied by (16) ; second, a higher increases bankers'marginal bene…t of relaxing the collateral constraint by investing into an extra unit of capital: as a result, bankers have a higher incentive to accumulate capital, so that the …rst factor on the right-hand side of (23) decreases in . As it will be detailed in the next section, these competing forces tend to o¤set each other, so that bankers'deposit-to-value ratio has little in ‡uence on capital misallocation and the propagation of technology disturbances.
As for the pledgeability of bank loans, the following summarizes the impact of …nancial collateralization on the productivity gap:
Proposition 1 Increasing the pledgeability of bank loans ( ) reduces the gap between bankers'and borrowers'marginal product of capital ( ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notably, a higher degree of …nancial collateralization expands bankers' lending capacity and compresses the spread charged over the deposit rate. In turn, lower lending rates allow borrowers to increase their borrowing capacity through a higher collateral value, ceteris paribus. The combination of these e¤ects is such that mpk I unambiguously increases in the degree of …nancial collateralization, reducing the productivity gap with respect to the borrowers. This factor will play a key role in determining the size of the response of gross output to a technology shock, as it will be detailed in Section 4.1.
Equilibrium Dynamics
To examine equilibrium dynamics we log-linearize the key behavioral rules and constraints around the non-stochastic steady state, where the incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (12) are assumed to hold with equality. 22 This local approximation method is accurate to the extent that we limit the technology shock to be bounded in the neighborhood of the steady state, so that neither borrowers'nor bankers'default occurs as an equilibrium outcome. As for borrowers'Euler equation (8):
where
. As for the bankers'Euler equation (18):
and 1 is the elasticity of the bankers' marginal product of capital times the ratio of borrowers'to bankers'capital holdings in the steady state (i.e.,
Once we obtain the solutions forq t andk B t as linear functions of the technology shifter, we can determine closed-form expressions for the equilibrium path of other variables in the model. We …rst focus on (26), whose forward-iteration leads to:
where 1 1 > 0. With this expression forq t , we can resort to (27) , obtaininĝ
where v 1 ( )(1 ) 1 > 0. Thus, it is possible to linearize total production in the neighborhood of the steady state, obtaining:
According to (30) , the dynamics of gross output is shaped by^ t , as well as by borrowers'capital holdings at time t 1: the second e¤ect captures the endogenous propagation of productivity shifts on gross output. In fact,ŷ t depends on the past history of shocks not only through the …rst-round impact of^ t , but also through the e¤ect of^ t 1 onk B t 1 , as implied by (29) . In light of this, we can rewrite (30) aŝ
where $ + v y B y . According to (31) , eliminating the key source of steady-state ine¢ ciencyi.e., attaining = 0-implies that total output's departures from the steady state would track the path of the technology shock, so that the model would feature no endogenous propagation of productivity shifts. 23 Moreover, we need to recall that envisaging limited enforceability of both deposit and loan contracts reduces capital misallocation as it emerges in the original KM economy, thus compressing with respect to the case in which R S I = 1. In this respect, the model produces a 'banking attenuator'that entirely rests on the functioning of …nancial frictions in banking activity, as compared with analogous e¤ects stemming from the procyclicality of the external …nance premium (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007) or monopolistic competition in the intermediation activity and staggered interest rate-setting schemes (Gerali et al., 2010) . Figure 2 displays the extent of the ampli…cation e¤ect on output in the KM model, as compared with our model, under the baseline calibration. 24 The next subsection examines the roots of this ampli…cation under di¤erent degrees of collateralization in the banking sector.
[Insert Figure 2 
Financial Collateral and Macroeconomic Ampli…cation
We have now lined up the elements necessary to examine how savers'perceived liquidity of bankers' …nancial assets a¤ects the amplitude of credit cycles. In this respect, there are three di¤erent channels through which a¤ects the endogenous response of total production to a technology shock:
As for the …rst term on the right hand side of (32), Proposition 2 details the e¤ect induced by a marginal change in the degree of …nancial collateralization on the response of borrowers'capital holdings to the technology shock.
Proposition 2 Increasing the degree of collateralization of bank loans ( ) attenuates the impact of the technology shock on both borrowers'holdings of capital and the capital price.
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to Proposition 2 the sensitivity of borrowers' capital holdings to the technology shifter decreases in . The intuition for this is twofold: …rst, increasing determines a more even distribution of capital goods, as re ‡ected by the drop in ; second, being able to pledge a higher share of …nancial assets reinforces the sensitivity of the capital price to the capital gain component in borrowers'Euler equation, , through the drop in the loan rate, while reducing the sensitivity to the dividend component (i.e., the shock). These e¤ects are mutually reinforcing and ultimately exert a negative force on the overall degree of macroeconomic ampli…cation of the system.
Turning our attention to the last two terms on the right hand side of (32), we know from Proposition 1 that the productivity gap between borrowers and bankers shrinks as …nancial collateralization increases (i.e., @ =@ < 0). Finally, it is immediate to prove that the last term on the right-hand side of (32) is positive, in light of greater collateralization of bank loans inducing a reallocation of capital from the bankers to the borrowers. In turn, this transfer implies both a …rst-order positive e¤ect on y B and a (milder) second-order positive impact on y, so that the overall e¤ect on y B =y is positive. 25 
[Insert Figure 3]
To sum up, an increase in causes competing e¤ects on $. First, greater …nancial collateralization depresses the pass-through of^ t 1 on borrowers' capital holdings, which in turn a¤ect total production with a lag. Second, raising exerts two distinct e¤ects on the pass-through of k B t 1 onŷ t : on one hand, bankers'marginal product of capital increases, implying a reduction of the productivity gap; on the other hand, borrowers' contribution to total production increases, as the reduction in the productivity gap re ‡ects higher capital accumulation in the hands of the borrowers. The sum of these three forces potentially leads to mixed results on output ampli…cation, as captured by the second-round e¤ect of technology disturbances. To address this, we plot $ as a function of and . 26 The aim of this exercise is to examine the direction of the overall e¤ect exerted by …nancial collateralization on macroeconomic volatility, rather than quantifying an empirically plausible multiplier emerging from the interaction of bankers'and borrowers'…nancial constraints. 27 As it emerges from Figure 3 , increasing compresses $, at any level of . By contrast, increasing the income share of capital in bankers' production technology ampli…es the second-round response of output. This is because ampli…es the productivity gap through its positive e¤ect on . 28 All in all, the general picture emerging from this exercise is that allowing for greater …nancial collateralization attenuates the overall degree of ampli…cation of technology disturbances. The next subsection examines how this property re ‡ects into cyclical movements in bank leverage, whose behavior is key to understanding how bankers'balance sheet a¤ects the amplitude of credit cycles.
The Role of Leverage
To enlarge our perspective on the ampli…cation/attenuation induced by bankers'…nancial collateral, we take a closer look at their balance sheet. To this end, we de…ne bankers' equity as the di¤erence between the value of total assets (i.e., loans and capital) and liabilities (i.e., deposits):
with leverage de…ned as the ratio between loans and equity: lev I t = b B t =e I t . Figure 4 reports the response of selected variables to a one-standard deviation shock to technology. 29 As implied by (30) , on impact output responds one-to-one with respect to the shock, regardless of the degree of …nancial collateralization. However, as increases the second-round 26 In Appendix C we show that di¤erent combinations of and ! have negligible e¤ects on the relationship between …nancial collateralization on macroeconomic ampli…cation. In fact, Figure C1 shows that varying has virtually no e¤ect on the amplitude of the response to the technology shock, in light of the competing e¤ects it has on bankers'marginal product of capital. 27 We leave this task for future research employing larger scale dynamic general equilibrium models. 28 It is important to emphasize that increasing may violate the condition G 0 (0) > % > G 0 (1), which ensures an interior solution as for how much capital bankers should hold in the neighborhood of the steady state. To see why this is the case, recall that k I 1 = %. Increasing in ‡ates bankers'marginal product of capital, while leaving their user cost una¤ected: Thus, as increases bankers are induced to hold an increasing stock of capital, so that the equality holds. An important aspect is that this e¤ect tends to kick in earlier as declines. This is because a drop in the degree of …nancial collateralization depresses bankers'user cost of capital. Therefore, as declines and increases the set of steady-state allocations in which both bankers and borrowers hold capital restricts, as the condition % > G 0 (1) is eventually violated and borrowers'may virtually end up with negative capital holdings. 29 The baseline parameterization is the same as that employed in Figure 2 . As for , we impose a rather conservative value, 0.4, which allows us to obtain a …nite distribution of capital in the steady state. response is gradually muted. To complement our analytical insight and provide further intuition on this channel, we examine the behavior of a set of variables involved in bankers'intermediation activity. In this respect, note that deposits tend to decline at low values of , while increasing as bankers can pledge a higher share of their …nancial assets. The reason for this can be better understood by recalling the nature of the interaction between bankers'…nancial and real assets. The interplay takes place on two levels: on one hand, both assets have a positive e¤ect on savers' deposits, as embodied by (12); on the other hand, it is possible to uncover a crowding out e¤ect, as increasing bankers'real asset holdings exerts a negative force on lending by reducing borrowers' collateral.
How do these properties a¤ect the transmission of an expansionary technology shock? Due to the capital productivity gap between borrowers and bankers, the technology shift necessarily causes a decline of bankers'real assets, thus expanding borrowers'capital and borrowing. 30 Therefore, in equilibrium deposits are in ‡uenced by two opposite forces, namely an expansion in the amount of bankers'…nancial assets and a contraction in their stock of real assets. In this respect, the implied allocation of bankers'assets re ‡ects a countercyclical ‡ight to quality pattern (see, inter alia, Lang and Nakamura, 1995): during expansions (contractions), bankers increase (decrease) their holdings of the inherently riskier assets-bank loans-while decreasing (increasing) their capital holdings, which do not bear any risk of default.
[Insert Figure 4 ] How do these diverging forces translate in terms of bankers' ability to attract deposits and leverage? As drops the impact of bank loans is gradually muted and deposits eventually track the dynamics of bankers'capital. In this context, the contraction of bankers'real asset overcomes the drop in deposits, so that lending expands in excess of bank equity, potentially leading to an increase in leverage. In fact, a procyclical leverage ratio is associated with a relevant degree of macroeconomic ampli…cation, when bankers' …nancial assets are regarded as relatively illiquid. Figure 3 shows this tends to be the case for < 0:5, under our baseline parameterization.
Capital Adequacy Requirements
The analysis so far has shown that limited enforceability of deposit contracts may reduce the productivity gap between borrowers and lenders, which is key to quantify the amplitude of credit cycles. In light of this, our next objective is to understand to which extent a regulator may promote a more e¢ cient allocation of productive capital by 'leaning against'capital misallocation. In this respect, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has explicitly indicated that-conditional on enhancing the resilience of the …nancial system-the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England should intend the pursual of productive capital allocation e¢ ciency as part of its macroprudentialpolicy mandate:
"Subject to achievement of its primary objective, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) should support the Government's economic objectives by acting in a way that, where possible, facilitates the supply of …nance for productive investment provided by the UK's …nancial system." (Remit and Recommendations for the Financial Policy Committee, HM Treasury, July 8, 2015).
Our economy lends itself to the analysis of this particular problem, in light of the strict connection between the capital productivity gap between borrowers and bankers and the amplitude of credit cycles. 31 To this end, we introduce two complementary tools of regulation. First, we assume deposit insurance, which ensures that savers do not su¤er a loss in the event of bankers'default. 32 A direct implication of such a measure is to shift the risk of bankers'default to the government (or a hypothetical interbank deposit protection fund), so that the renegotiation of deposit contracts is redundant and bankers' …nancial constraint may be discarded. However, in order to mitigate bankers'moral hazard behavior, the regulator imposes an explicit capital adequacy requirement (see, e.g., Van den Heuvel, 2008). According to this regulatory constraint, equity needs to be at least a fraction of the loans, for bankers to be able to operate:
where denotes the capital-to-asset ratio. Introducing this regulatory constraint modi…es the loan rate:
Notably, (35) is isomorphic to (16) , with R B increasing in the capital-to-asset ratio. To provide an intuition for this, we combine (34) with (33), obtaining:
31 Notably, our model abstracts from trade-o¤s that impose the policy-maker to balance the incentive to improve the allocation of productive capital with an alternative …nancial stability objective, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) , inter alia. However, our primary interest is to understand how far the policy-maker can go to resolve the key distortion in the credit economy, so that there is no need to introduce additional propagation mechanisms that would only hinder the analytical tractability of the model. 32 As in Van den Heuvel (2008), deposit insurance is left unmodeled, though it is argued that it generally improves banks'ability to extend credit (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 ).
As embodied by (36) , imposing a capital-to-asset ratio to bankers'intermediation activity amounts to constrain deposits from above by the current value of bankers'collateral, with the implied degree of pledgeability of bank loans being a negative function of . In fact, there is a direct mapping between the capital-to-asset ratio implicit in the capital requirement constraint imposed by the regulator and the degree of collateralization of bank loans as it emerges from the incentive compatibility constraint (12) , which is derived in the absence of any form of deposit insurance. 33 Intuitively, a higher leverage (lower capital) ratio implies a riskier exposure of the …nancial intermediary. This translates into greater transaction costs savers would have to bear in order to seize bank loans in the event of bankers'default. In turn, these costs have a direct impact on degree of collateralization of bankers'…nancial assets that is implicit in (34) .
[Insert Figure 5 ] Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, absent any trade-o¤ between enhancing capital allocation and ensuring …nancial stability, the optimal policy consists of setting the capital-to-asset ratio to its lower bound. Along with minimizing the fraction of bank assets that can be …nanced by issuing deposit liabilities, = 0 contracts the intermediation spread, thus ensuring a more e¢ cient allocation of capital between bankers and borrowers. Figure 5 -which reports the response of the economy to a positive technology shock under this policy-con…rms this view. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that even a null capital ratio is not enough to neutralize the endogenous propagation channel stemming from capital misallocation, as stated by the next proposition.
Proposition 3
The gap between bankers' and borrowers' marginal product of capital ( ) cannot be closed by setting the capital-to-asset ratio ( ) within the range of admissible values.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To dig deeper on this property, Figure 6 maps the spread between the loan and the deposit rate (y-axis) and the productivity gap (x-axis), for di¤erent values of the capital-to-asset ratio ( ) and the loan-to-asset ratio applying to the borrowers (!). As we move down along each locus, decreases from its upper bound to the value consistent with = 0. The color of a given line switches from green to blue when drops below its lower bound. In line with Proposition 3, closing the productivity gap through a capital requirement within the set of its admissible values proves to be infeasible. However, it is important to acknowledge that higher loan-to-value ratios applying to the loan contracts compress the productivity gap at any value of . In fact, raising ! relaxes borrowers'collateral constraint, allowing them to increase their capital holdings, so that bankers' marginal product of capital increases in equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 6 ] Figure 5 also shows that = 0 may only be attained at negative values of and R B R S . In Figure 5 -where the capital-to-asset ratio compatible with a null productivity gap is denoted by =0 -the endogenous propagation of the shock is actually switched o¤ under a negative capitalto-asset ratio, so that gross output tracks the dynamics of the productivity shifter and leverage is completely acyclical. However, according to (34) , setting = =0 would induce bankers to hold negative equity, for any level of credit being extended. Although we rule this out as an equilibrium outcome, it is interesting to brie ‡y examine the underlying incentives of the bankers in such a scenario: according to (36) , through a negative capital-to-asset ratio the regulator implicitly pushes for 'hyper-collateralizing'bank loans. In turn, this eventually induces bankers to set a loan rate below the interest rate on deposits, which amounts to subsidizing borrowers'capital investment so as to resolve the distortion.
A Countercyclical Capital Bu¤er
We now turn our attention to an alternative regulatory tool, in the attempt to reduce output ‡uctuations by a¤ecting the cyclicality of bankers'balance sheet, without necessarily neutralizing the distortion stemming from capital misallocation. Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest of policymakers towards leaning against credit imbalances, pursuing macroeconomic stabilization through policy rules that set a countercyclical capital bu¤er. De facto, countercyclical capital regulation is a key block of the Basel III international regulatory framework for banks. 34 Based on the analysis of the transmission mechanism and the response of bank capital, we now examine the functioning of this type of policy tool within our framework. Thus, we allow for capital requirements to vary with the macroeconomic conditions (see, e.g., Angeloni and Faia, 2013 , Nelson and Pinter, 2016 and Clerc et al., 2015 :
where ' = 0 implies a constant capital-to-asset ratio, while ' > 0 induces a countercyclical capital bu¤er. 35 By linearizing the time-varying counterpart of (35) in the neighborhood of the steady state we obtain: 34 The regulatory framework evolved through three main waves. Basel I has introduced the basic capital adequacy ratio as the foundation for banking risk regulation. Basel II has reinforced it and allowed banks to use internal risk-based measure to weight the share of asset to be hold. Basel III has been brought in response to the 2007-2008 crisis, with the key innovation consisting of introducing countercyclical capital requirements, that is, imposing banks to build resilience in good times with higher capital requirements and relax them during bad times. 35 According to the Basel III regime, capital regulation can respond to a wide range of macroeconomic indicators. Here we assume it to respond to deviations of b B t from its long-run equilibrium, b B .
is positive, in light of assuming I R S < 1. We then linearize (37), obtaining:
After linearizing borrowers' …nancial constraint, we can substitute forb B t in (39) and plug the resulting expression into (38), so as to obtain:
Thus, it is possible to establish a connection between the loan rate and borrowers'expected collateral value. Increasing the responsiveness of the capital-to-asset ratio to changes in aggregate lending ampli…es this channel: raising ' implies that marginal deviations of b B t from its steady state transmit more promptly to the capital-to-asset ratio and, in turn, to the loan rate through the combined e¤ect of (38) and (39). This induces a feedback e¤ect on borrowers'capacity to attract external funding, as embodied by their collateral constraint: higher sensitivity of the loan rate to variations in aggregate lending (i.e., a steeper loan supply function) implies stronger discounting of borrowers' expected collateral. In the limit (i.e., as ' ! 1) there is a perfect pass-through of E tqt+1 +k B t onR B t . Therefore, as in the face of a technology shock both terms move in the same direction and by the same extent, borrowing does not deviate from its steady-state level and output displays no endogenous propagation.
[Insert Figure 7 ]
To assess the stabilization performance of the countercyclical capital bu¤er rule, in Figure 7 we set the steady-state capital-to-asset ratio to 8%-in line with the full weight level of Basel I and the treatment of non-rated corporate loans in Basel II and III-while varying ' over the support [0; 1]. 36 As expected, at ' = 0 (i.e., a capital-to-asset ratio kept at its steady-state level) we observe the strongest ampli…cation of the output response, while the lending rate and bank leverage are both acyclical. By contrast, increasing the degree of countercyclicality of the capital bu¤er proves to be e¤ective at attenuating the response of gross output to the shock, progressively compressing bank leverage. Notably, as ' ! 1 leverage displays a strong degree of countercyclicality, 37 while lending does not deviate from its steady-state level, as conjectured above. In turn, this results in the response of gross output featuring no endogenous propagation of technology shocks, despite the regulator's policy action is not aimed at tackling capital misallocation and, therefore, the steady-state productivity gap is not closed.
Concluding Remarks
We have devised a credit economy where bankers intermediate funds between savers and borrowers, assuming that bankers'ability to collect deposits is a¤ected by limited enforceability: as a result, if bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers' asset holdings. In this context, we have examined the role of bank loans as a form of collateral in deposit contracts. Due to the structure of our credit economy, which may well account for di¤erent forms of …nancial intermediation, savers anticipate that liquidating …nancial assets is conditional on borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This friction limits the degree of collateralization of bankers'…nancial assets beyond that of capital. We have demonstrated three main results: i) limited enforceability of deposit contracts counteracts the e¤ects of limited enforceability of loan contracts, thus reducing capital misallocation as it emerges in KM; ii) greater collateralization of bankers'…nancial assets dampens macroeconomic ‡uctuations by reducing the degree of procyclicality of bank leverage; iii) while imposing a …xed capital-to-asset ratio to the bankers cannot fully neutralize capital misallocation and enhance a more e¢ cient allocation of productive capital-thus switching o¤ the associated endogenous propagation channel of productivity shock-a countercyclical capital adequacy requirement proves to be rather e¤ective at smoothing credit cycles.
Our model is necessarily stylized, though it can be generalized along a number of dimensions. For instance, a realistic extension could consist of allowing bankers to issue equity (outside equity), so as to evaluate how a di¤erent debt-equity mix may a¤ect macroeconomic ampli…cation over expansions-when equity can be issued frictionlessly-and contractions, when equity issuance may be precluded due to tighter information frictions. This factor should counteract the role of …nancial assets and help obtaining a countercyclical leverage. In connection with this point, we could also allow for occasionally binding …nancial constraints, so as to evaluate how the policy-maker should behave across contractions-when constraints tighten-and expansions, when constraints may become non-binding. However, as this type of extensions necessarily hinder the analytical tractability of our problem, we leave them for future research projects based on large-scale models. Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
As borrowers'marginal product of capital equals one in the steady state, we restrict our analysis to the impact of on mpk I :
As for the partial derivative of bankers'marginal product of capital with respect to the loan rate:
As for @R B =@ < 0, this is negative, in light of assuming I R S < 1:
Thus, both factors on the right-hand side of (1) are negative and, since @ =@ = @mpk I =@ , increasing inevitably reduces the productivity gap.
Proof of Proposition 2
We …rst prove that increasing attenuates the impact of the technology shock on borrowers' capital-holdings. According to Equation (35) in the main text, v quanti…es the pass-through of^ t on k B t . In turn, the marginal impact of on v can be computed as:
where:
@R B @ and @ @ = @ @R B @R B @ :
Focusing on the second term on the right-hand side of (4), we can show this is negative, as: (i)
< 0, given that < 1; (ii) @ =@R B = != R B 2 < 0; (iii) @R B =@ < 0, as implied by (3).
As for the …rst term on the right-hand side of (4): ( )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) > 0. Furthermore:
As @R B =@ < 0, also the …rst term on the right-hand side of (4) is negative. Therefore, is a negative function of .
As for the impact of technology shocks on the capital price: @ @ = @ @ @ @ :
As for @ =@ :
while we already know that @ =@ > 0. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of on is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3
We know that G 0 (k I ) is a decreasing function of . Thus, we aim to prove that the gap between bankers' and borrowers' marginal product of capital is greater than zero at = 0. To this end, we combine the capital Euler equations of bankers and borrowers, obtaining:
We then impose G 0 (k I ) =0 < 1 to obtain
As R B =0 = R S (1+ I ) 1 I , all we need to prove is that
which can be manipulated to obtain
As B R S < 1, it is immediate to verify that both terms on the left-hand side of the last inequality are positive.
where # B t and t are the multipliers associated with borrowers' budget and collateral constraint, respectively. The …rst-order conditions are:
Condition (10) implies that a marginal decrease in borrowing today expands next period's utility and relaxes the current period's borrowing constraint. As for (11) , acquiring an additional unit of capital today allows to expand future consumption not only through the conventional capital gain and dividend channels, but also through the feedback e¤ect of the expected collateral value on the price of capital. As we consider linear preferences (i.e., # B t = # B = 1), (10) implies t = = 1 B R B . 1 Thus, the collateral constraint binds in the neighborhood of the steady state as long as R B < 1= B , which is imposed throughout the rest of the analysis. Finally, (11) can be rewritten as
The Lagrangian for bankers'optimization reads, instead, as
where # I t and t are the multipliers associated with bankers' budget constraint and enforcement constraint, respectively. The …rst-order conditions are: 
As we assume linear preferences, # I t = # I = 1. Therefore, conditions (14) and (15) imply that the …nancial constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of the steady state (i.e., t = > 0) as long as (i) R S I < 1 and (ii) R B I < 1. By combining (14) and (15) we obtain
Finally, from (16) we can retrieve the Euler equation governing bankers'investment in real assets:
Summary of the model
We have 12 endogenous variables: fq t g 1 t=0 , c S t ; b S Appendix D. Additional …gures Figure D1 : Comparison with KM under a technology shock.
Notes. Figure D1 graphs the response to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology, under the following parameterization: S = 0:99, I = 0:98, B = 0:97, = 0:95, = ! = 1, = 0:4. We consider two situations: the KM case, where 1 I R S = 0 (green-dashed line), and the baseline model (blue-continuos line). Figure D2 : Responses to a …nancial shock.
Notes. Figure D2 graphs the responses of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to the degree of collateralization, , under the following parameterization: S = 0:99, I = 0:98, B = 0:97, = 0:95, = ! = 1, = 0:4. Figure D3 : Responses to a shock to the capital-to-asset ratio.
Notes. Figure D3 graphs the responses of selected variables to a (negative) one-standard-deviation shock to capital-to-asset ratio, , under the following parameterization: S = 0:99, I = 0:98, B = 0:97, = 0:95, ! = 1, = 0:4.
